From acequias to groundwater-dependent communities across the state, New Mexicans are living the consequences of the state’s approach to water governance. To meet New Mexicans’ diverse water needs, New Mexico must decentralize and democratize how it manages its most scarce and vital resource: water.
This is an intended and likely outcome of successful implementation of the 2023 Water Security Planning Act (WSPA), which envisions the creation of regional water planning coordination bodies throughout the state.
During the recent legislative session, the New Mexico Water Advocates understandably focused much of its attention on state-level concerns—funding, and on Interstate Stream Commission (ISC) rules for carrying out state-mandated functions for implementing the WSPA. Scant attention was paid to the nine designated water planning regions or to the rules and authorities under which the regional entities would operate. This essay is intended to shift the focus of our concerns to the regions themselves.
From Uniformity to Polycentricity
The term “polycentric” denotes governance systems where decision-making authority over all uses of a public good (here, the water resource) is not held centrally by the state, but instead is divided across multiple, overlapping decision centers that use diverse approaches to coordinate their activities. Though the State’s initial rules for constituting the Regional Water Planning and Management Councils are still being debated, the “polycentricity” concept can be applied to governance practices that are likely to emerge from the Councils’ work. Polycentric governance is not limited to governments, nor does it imply a single form of institutional arrangement.
Embracing Diversity and Complexity
Heterogeneity in this context refers to differences and disparities among stakeholders that can affect the ability of a community to undertake successful collective action. These differences—in endowments, beliefs, preferences (including financial interests), occupations, education, ethnicity, etc.—can significantly influence whether it is possible for members of a community to find shared existential common ground despite differing perceptions of their individual self-interest. Individuals and groups often hold overlapping perspectives, which can either support or complicate collective action.
Design Principles for Collective Water Governance
In Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom identified several issues that are typically addressed in constituting and maintaining successful, long-lasting natural resource governance institutions. She called these “design principles.” They include:
- Clear resource and legitimate user boundaries exist and are understood.
- Rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.
- User benefits from managing the common pool resource as a public good or commons are proportionate to the inputs required from the user.
- Individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying those rules.
- Monitors accountable to the users monitor the users’ appropriation and provision levels.
- Monitors accountable to the users monitor the condition of the resource.
- Users who violate rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions by other users or by officials accountable to those users.
- Users have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts.
- The rights of users to devise their own institutions are supported by government authorities. (These institutional arrangements will vary among regions.)
- Actions operationalizing these design principles are organized in networks of nested enterprises, providing both horizontal and vertical linkages for coordination and joint action.
This list of design principles, while based on Ostrom’s, has been updated and modified by more recent empirical work of scholars and and practitioners.[1]
Other factors such as the size of user groups, differing types of heterogeneity within or between them, and the type of government regime within which users operate may also be relevant.
These core design principles offer guidance as to how New Mexico’s incipient Regional Water Planning and Management Councils might be constituted. Past attempts at regional water planning have foundered in part because—contrary to language in the 1987 bill that authorized “regions of the state [to] plan for their own water futures”—State water agencies seemed more concerned to maintain control and to insist on uniformity than to tackle real problems identified by people living and working within the regions.
A Pragmatic Path Forward
To what extent can these design principles be useful in crafting institutions for New Mexico’s water planning and management? Might they be applicable in designing polycentric governance and management systems at a variety of scales? We can’t be sure. However, the Water Advocates started down this road in the belief that water planning could be made effective if centralized state water agencies really were to listen to the people they serve. This approach suggests a strategy to make that happen.
In the article cited above, the author (Cox) asserts that a probabilistic rather than deterministic approach to understanding the usefulness of the design principles is warranted. Experiments in game theory as well as case study data from the field suggest that in repeated interactions participants begin to employ more cooperative strategies as they learn more about each other. A polycentric approach provides opportunities for actors in each region to communicate informally, recognize shared interests and conflicting needs and values, and build the trust needed to come to workable solutions to our multiple water crises.
Let’s Build Them—Together
If the state is sincere about empowering communities to shape their water futures, it must support the formation of Regional Water Planning and Management Councils that reflect local voices, address local conditions, and apply proven principles of collective governance. The path won’t be easy—but by listening, learning, and trusting local knowledge, New Mexico has a chance to craft resilient institutions equal to the challenge.
John Brown is a member of the New Mexico Water Advocates board and a former executive director of the New Mexico Water Dialogue. He has taught in the public administration program and the political science department at the University of New Mexico.
[1] Cox, M., G. Arnold, and S. Villamayor Tomás. A review of design principles for community-based natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15(4), 38;
[online] URL: http//www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol/15/iss4/art38
Glossary of Key Terms
Polycentric Governance
A system where decision-making authority is distributed among multiple centers of power—such as local, regional, and state entities—rather than being concentrated in a single central authority. These centers operate semi-independently but coordinate with one another, allowing for more locally tailored solutions.
Common Pool Resource (CPR)
A natural resource—such as water, fisheries, or forests—that is shared by a group of users. CPRs are difficult to exclude people from using, but overuse by individuals can deplete the resource for everyone. Effective management requires collective action and agreed-upon rules.
Design Principles (Ostrom’s Principles)
A set of foundational guidelines identified by political economist Elinor Ostrom for creating successful, self-governing institutions to manage shared natural resources. These principles include clearly defined boundaries, participatory rule-making, monitoring, and conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Nested Enterprises
A governance structure where smaller, local institutions are embedded within larger, overarching frameworks. This layering allows for coordination across different scales (local, regional, state) while maintaining local autonomy where appropriate.
Heterogeneity
The diversity within a group or region in terms of characteristics like culture, income, education, interests, or resource access. In water governance, heterogeneity can either hinder cooperation (due to conflicting interests) or enhance it (by bringing multiple perspectives and strengths).
Operational Rules
The specific, day-to-day rules that govern who can use a resource, how, when, and under what conditions. These differ from constitutional rules (which define who can make rules) and collective-choice rules (which set broader governance policies).
Graduated Sanctions
A conflict management principle where rule violations are addressed with penalties that increase in severity based on the frequency or seriousness of the offense. This encourages compliance without relying solely on harsh punishment.
Low-Cost Local Arenas for Conflict Resolution
Accessible and affordable ways for users of a shared resource to resolve disagreements without going to court. These can include local mediation processes or community meetings.
Probabilistic Approach
An analytical perspective that acknowledges uncertainty and variation in outcomes. Rather than assuming a particular governance model will always work (a deterministic approach), a probabilistic view suggests that certain principles increase the likelihood of success under the right conditions.
Water Security Planning Act (WSPA)
A 2023 New Mexico state law intended to modernize and improve water planning by delegating responsibility and authority to Regional Water Planning and Management Councils. The law emphasizes local participation, scientific data, and strategic coordination to address long-term water challenges.
Regional Water Planning and Management Councils
Entities envisioned under the WSPA to lead water planning efforts at the regional level. These councils are meant to represent diverse communities’ local interests and create actionable plans tailored to each region’s specific water issues, values, and priorities.
State Water Agencies (OSE/ISC)
Refers to the Office of the State Engineer (OSE) and the Interstate Stream Commission (ISC)—the two key New Mexico state agencies responsible for water rights administration, planning, and compact compliance.
July 10, 2025 @ 9:33 am
You need to rail against the illegal practices of the OSE that are hurting New Mexico. I’ll give you and outrageous example. Down in Rodeo, NM we filed for new appropriation of 0.5 acre feet of consumptive use annually. The application was denied by the OSE because they said the San Simon Basin was fully appropriated pursuant the Arizona v. California 1963 Case. The Deming office is required to inventory water uses under the court decree annually and publish a report which is filed with the court and a copy is filed with the Interstate Stream Commission. They report that fields in the Gila and San Simon Basin are being fallowed. They have been fallowed for more than 40 years. We have checked the annual reports and the historical aerial photography. Most of the fields have not been irrigated for many years. You would think that 40 years of fallowing would be called forfeiture. The OSE even seeks elsewhere to forfeit the water rights after 16 years of non-use under the judicial doctrine of abandonment. That water needs to be placed bac into beneficial use to support economic activity in Rural New Mexico.
July 10, 2025 @ 9:16 am
Further, water use and management is already decentralized. The State Engineer has offices six offices in the state and has identified management areas for each office. OSE policies vary around the state. We do not need more hydrobureaucracies. Texas divided the State into 16 regions and it is a bloody nightmare dealing with them. Potentates and potentates galore. It is just human nature. We do not need social engineering. The hearing unit has denied at least six protests that have been filed for social reasons and not one whit of technical data to support them. The protestants are in violation of the old English rules against barratry or malicious abuse of process, a misdemeanor, under today’s parlance. We at WaterBank have never failed to meet a water rights demand from a Buyer or a Seller in 50+ years. We do not see the future shortages you and the Water Advocates propound. You are correct when you say the OSE needs better funding. We deal with them statewide nearly every day. The problem is high turnover. Very little historical memory within the agency. But, good people trying to help New Mexicans,
July 8, 2025 @ 12:49 pm
Hello, John,
I don’t want to speak directly against the idea of decentralization. However, let me point out that we have de facto decentralized water use because water rights have been essentially privatized as property. The constitutional mandate about water belonging to the people at large is limited to unappropriated water. Discussing water use, therefore, is largely discussing property, and that basis makes discussion difficult. As long as water rights remain property, discussants are not equal. In so far as rights are the prerogative of the state, the state umbrella for the kind of local discussion you imagine must change. That is, the nature of water rights needs to change, constitutionally to allow for any kind of equitable, decentralized, institutional mechanism of water use distribution. Ironically, it seems to me that were water rights themselves centralized, the state claiming back those rights appropriated by use, one could then imagine the kind of decentralized situation you describe.